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Climate change is as much an issue of power as it is an environmental one. A 
critical geopolitical analysis of climate change illuminates the relationship between 
power and climate change. This thesis explores how climate change is an epistemological 
issue, and brings geopolitics into conversation with science and technology studies by 
merging subaltern geopolitics and sociotechnical imaginaries frameworks.  
Through a case study of the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research 
(IAI), the goal is to explore imaginaries of climate change science outside of dominant 
climate change narratives; and to develop an understanding of how power is experienced, 
mediated, and contested through scientific organizations. Findings from this thesis reveal: 
how the IAI leverages reconfigures geopolitical tensions between the United States and 
Cuba; and practices utilized to address issues of knowledge validity, credibility, and 
representation. Overall an examination of the IAI reveals how power is exercised and 
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Research Problem  
As the consequences of human activity continue to affect biospheric and 
environmental conditions, society finds itself scrambling to resolve climate change. 
Efforts to address climate change at an international scale have mainly focused on 
addressing environmental causes and impacts via innovation and technology (Hulme, 
2008; Bulkeley, 2019; Demeritt, 2001); however, this neglects underlying socio-cultural 
causes of climate change that require systemic societal change. For climate change 
response efforts to be holistic, they must both grapple with environmental and social 
causes and address environmental and social impacts. As such, we must acknowledge 
that climate change is more than an environmental issue, it is, first and foremost, a matter 
of power and inequality (Bulkeley, 2019).   
Power in climate change is manifested and perpetuated in many ways, among 
them via dominant representations of climate change. For example, in its assessments, the 
IPCC discerns that "climate change is a global commons problem that implies the need 
for international cooperation in tandem with local, national, and regional policies in many 
distinct matters" (Allen et al., 2014). This emphasis on climate change as a global 
commons problem has been reinforced by many organizations, policies, institutions, and 
scholars. However, the global commons narrative allows economically and politically 
dominant states –defined here as sovereign states that have a defined territory, 
population, government, as well as the ability to establish relations with other states– to 
shift the burden of their actions onto a multitude of other states and effectively “hide in a 
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crowd”. Take, for example, the disproportionate rates of pollution and emissions released 
by a handful of states. In 2014, China (30%), the United States (15%), the European 
Union (9%), India (7%), Russia (5%), and Japan (4%) were responsible for 70% of 
global carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas (Hovi, Skodvin, and Aakre, 2013; EPA, 2014). 
Not much has changed since. The causes of climate change and who contribute to the 
problem, let alone who participates in response efforts, is inherently disproportionate. 
These states (i.e., China, the United States, the European Union, India, Russia, 
and Japan) are simultaneously the most influential actors in climate change conventions 
and negotiations worldwide, and are listed are some of the most powerful states in our 
current global political order: three of these states (U.S., Russia, and China) comprise the 
five permanent members of the United Nations; Japan, the United States, and Russia are 
part of the Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations; all of these states are members of 
the Group of Twenty (G20); and the majority of these states, accounting for the multi-
state composition of the European Union, are geographically concentrated in the “global 
North.” However, in comparison, small states –in terms of economic capacity and 
political influence– exercise the least influence in negotiations and conventions and are 
nonetheless the first to feel the impacts of climate change (Carey et al., 2016; Hovi, 
Skodvin, and Aakre, 2013). More so, any actions taken by small states are unlikely to 
change current conditions –if these states were to drastically reduce or cut all emissions 
and take drastic actions towards climate change the impact would barely be felt (Hovi, 
Skodvin, and Aakre, 2013).  
To conflate matters, much of the knowledge, both scientific and political, 
produced on climate change is also derived from more powerful states. Many of the states 
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responsible for driving climate change, both globally and across the Americas, produce 
knowledge that reinforces narratives favorable to them (Hovi, Skodvin, and Aakre, 
2013). This is not to say that climate change science –the production, distribution, and 
use of climate change knowledge– is erroneous, however, it is neither apolitical. Among 
these practices is the construction of climate change narratives that drive particular 
representations of the issue which skew the direct causes of the problem. These narratives 
claim legitimacy not only through the authoritative meaning assigned to science 
(Jasanoff, 2010), but through dominant spatial imaginaries of the world that affect who is 
a credible actor and whose knowledge is valid (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; Klenk and 
Meehan, 2015; Felt et al., 2016; Ford et al., 2016).  
To address climate change, we must engage with the issue as a matter of power 
and inequality. One avenue to explore this relationship between climate change and 
power is through a critical geopolitical analysis of climate change science. If geopolitics 
is about the way the world is made known (Dalby, 2013), then knowledge and knowledge 
production is a key component to understanding how the world is represented, and who is 
representing. By understanding how climate change is made known and represented via 
science we can explore how dominant representations of climate change are made 
known, understand who does and does not benefit from such representations, and 
examine where hegemonic structures of power are codified and ratified. In my research, I 
ask: How is climate change made known? How does power affect climate change 





The central analysis of this research is the Inter-American Institute for Global 
Change Research (hereafter referred to as the IAI or the Institute). In my research, I use 
the IAI as a vehicle through which I can examine the relationship between science, space, 
and power, and reveal ways of navigating dominant sources of power in climate change 
science. 
Established as an intergovernmental organization, the IAI is primarily tasked with 
supporting (i.e. funding, resources, infrastructure) and coordinating (i.e. research 
programs, trainings, conferences) scientific research regarding the extent, causes, and 
consequences of climate change in the Americas. Their mission is to support and use the 
best science available to inform decision-makers and guide policy action on climate 
change. Their work is set in the Western Hemisphere including the areas of North, 
Central, and South America and the Caribbean (also referred to here as the Americas). 
Current members of the IAI include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
(Figure 1). Despite its large geographic extent and range of member countries, the IAI is 
a small organization and not as widely known as its global counterparts, such as Future 
Earth. Its operational budget ranges from USD 1-2million, and its directorate is 
composed of a ten-person team in a small office in the LATU (Laboratorio Tecnologico 
del Uruguay) campus. 
The IAI defines global change as “the long-term chemical, biological, and 
physical processes of the Earth system” that are subject to constant alternation and “is 
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both natural in origin and human-induced.”  In my research, global change is rendered 
synonymous with climate change; that is, I am using climate change to stand for what the 
IAI calls global change. 
 
Figure 1: Map of member states to the IAI 
My research utilizes the IAI as its central point of analysis for several reasons. 
First, the IAI has been producing knowledge on climate change for over 25 years and is 
one of the few institutions to producing climate change science specific to the Americas. 
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The longevity of the IAI and its geographic scope are a useful foundation for studying the 
relationship between climate change and power over time; the IAI is situated in a region 
with historical legacies of violence (i.e., colonialism) that have implications for power 
relations. Second, the Institute is headquartered in a state categorized as part of the global 
South. This point is crucial to arguments later developed in this research that stand to 
illustrate: how dominant knowledge is particular to geographic location (Felt et al., 2016; 
Lahsen & Nobre, 2007); how the normalization of dominant knowledge affects politics 
and is derived from hegemonic impositions (Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez, 2018; Sharp, 
2013); and how valid and credible knowledge can, and does, emanate from various places 
and cultures (Sharp, 2013; Agnew, 2007).  
Lastly, the efforts of the IAI, as explored in later chapters, implicitly works to 
unravel myths tied to the arguments mentioned above. In particular, I analyze the 
practices of the IAI to examine how power in climate change via science can be 
renegotiated and navigated. 
 
Literature Review 
This section provides an overview of the conceptual framework of the thesis and 
its theoretical contributions. The following section examines how climate change, vis-a-
vis science, is a matter of power and inequality. To build my framework, I draw on 
scholarly literature in science and technology studies (STS) and political geography that 
develops an understanding of how power operates through space and time via science and 
technology.  
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As a discipline, geography sits at a nexus between the social and physical sciences 
and provides an avenue to examine matters of power and inequality in climate change. 
Questions of power and dominance in the international system have long been a concern 
of political geography and geopolitics (Dalby, 2010; O'Tuathail, 1999; Slater, 2008; 
Sharp, Routledge, Philo, and Paddison 2000). Over the last decade, there has been a 
proliferation of geographic scholarship examining power and dominance in the context of 
climate change. To date, geographic research concerning the relationship between climate 
change and power have spanned several schools of thought (i.e. constructivist, positivist, 
feminist, etc.) and have examined varying aspects. A wide range of literature has been 
critical of how power and geopolitics play out in international conferences and 
conventions (Hovi, Skodvin, and Aakre, 2013; Craggs, 2014; Craggs and Mahony, 2014). 
For example, Weisser (2014) illustrates how documents produced at international climate 
conferences reinforce particular norms of conducting politics that have geopolitical 
repercussions. Documents codify rules, structures, and historical conditions that favor 
some states, and their input, over others. Similarly, geographic research has also explored 
the relationship between climate change and power in global environmental assessments 
(Fogel, 2004; Ford et al., 2016; Hulme, 2016; Ho-Lem et al., 2011). 
Research by Hulme and Mahony (2010), delves into the implicit biases of climate 
change knowledge at the IPCC. The authors are critical of the authoritative momentum 
the IPCC has gained in normalizing some disciplinary expertise over others; they are also 
critical of the imbalance in the geographic origins of those who author IPCC’s many 
reports. For Hulme and Mahony the implications of biases present in the IPCC affect 
which disciplines participate in climate change science, which states are given scientific 
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authority via authorship, how marginalized voices and knowledges are silenced via a 
consensus model, and how political decisions are legitimized via IPCC science. 
The production of climate change knowledge is also reflective of social 
asymmetries (Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez, 2018; Agnew, 2007; Jasanoff, 2004; Mahony 
and Hulme, 2018; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007). In particular, Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez 
(2018) illustrate how space, place, and power influence knowledge and coproduce social 
orders within the science-policy interface. By deploying a sociotechnical imaginary 
framework, the authors reveal how transdisciplinary climate research remains subject to 
power imbalances and structural barriers despite its engagement in a wide variety of 
stakeholders and places. The authors conclude that transdisciplinary science must 
"grapple with its epistemic geographies and lived geopolitical realities to truly change the 
intellectual climate." Outside of the relationship between knowledge and power, 
geography has also engaged with climate change and power concerning national security 
(Deudney, 1990), global health (Miller, 2015), and gender (Carey et al, 2016; Sultana, 
2014; Israel & Sachs, 2013). In the context of climate change, this literature provides 
important lessons of how climate change narratives are produced and represented, by 
whom, and for whose benefit.  
However, political geography and human geography writ large have only recently 
begun to grapple with how climate change "comes into being, and what in turn it creates, 
entangles, undoes, and removes with it" (Bulkeley, 2019; Brace and Geoghegan, 2010). 
More so, geographers have recently been called to re-examine traditional geopolitical 
discourses (Bulkeley, 2019); to develop new questions regarding environmental 
geopolitics (Dalby, 2014); to include previously excluded and exploited voices and 
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experiences (Castree et al., 2014; Mahony and Hulme, 2018); to provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationships between knowledge, power, and justice (Carey et al., 
2016; Sultana, 2014); and to make social science contributions that provide a spatial 
examination of knowledge (Hulme, 2008).  
To deepen our understanding of how climate change is made known, via 
geography, this section presents climate change as an epistemological issue. Utilizing 
Mahony and Hulme’s (2018) epistemic geographies, “the spatialities of the 
technoscientific knowledges which underpin understandings of human-induced climate 
change,” I focus on how climate change science–the production, distribution, and use of 
climate change knowledge–as the primary battleground where dominant representations 
of climate change are made known, and where hegemonic structures of power are 
codified and ratified. To accomplish this goal, I take note from Mahony and Hulme 
(2018) who urge “geographers [to] join colleagues across science and technology studies 
(STS) in examining the specific spaces of climate change knowledge production.”  
Epistemic Geographies of Climate Change Science 
Since its beginnings, science and technology studies (STS) has been engaged with 
the epistemology of science. The field examines science and technology as social 
institutions whose structures and practices are subject to change with external influence. 
STS is also concerned with the impacts, risks, and benefits of science and technology on 
society. By placing science under a microscope, scholars in STS argue that science is 
“co-produced” by society. Referring to the “proposition that the ways in which we know 
and represent that world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which 
we choose to live in it” (Jasanoff, 2004), the notion of co-production illustrates how 
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science, located in the domain of the natural, is entangled with the social; and, how both 
the natural and social shape and influence each other’s trajectories. 
 Drawing from Jasanoff's (2004) work, co-production brings to light the 
subjective nature of science, despite its objective designation, and the implications this 
has for the world. For example, St Clair (2006) illustrates how expert knowledge 
produced by global institutions, such as the World Bank or the UN, also produces social 
orders. By extension, a co-productionist account of science and technology reveals a 
connection between science and power. Mahony and Hulme's (2010) analysis of the 
IPCC reveals a similar connection between producing science and social orders at the 
IPCC, which is not only influenced by a particular social order but reproduces it via its 
authors, institutional structure, and review process. Similarly, Lövbrand (2011), uses a 
co-productionist framework to examine how policy affects funding and research 
concerning climate change in the European Union, through a case study of the Adaptation 
and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy, which in turn prioritizes 
specific practices and topics that affect how climate change policy is made and 
interpreted. Science is not immediately legitimate; it is made legitimate, represented as 
legitimate, and used to legitimize. "The ways in which we think about and represent 
reality are intimately linked to the ways in which it is acted upon and governed," 
(Lövbrand, 2011) and science is a medium through which we think about our realities.   
Because science is a critical site where norms, values, meanings, and social order 
are developed and reproduced (Demeritt, 2001; Jasanoff, 2004), the characterization of 
science as a supreme objective authority has led to the production of dominant 
environmental narratives. One implication has been the creation of dominant narratives 
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that are perceived as absolute (Jasanoff, 2010). For example, narratives equating science 
with progress are used to justify and prioritize certain scientific or technological 
investments over others (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). Similarly, Sheila Jasanoff (2010) has 
demonstrated how representations of the environment come into being via understandings 
of how we think the world should be, and how this ultimately shapes a particular 
representation of climate change as inherently global. Demeritt's (2001) study regarding 
general circulation models (GCM) illustrates how this particular technology has 
"constructed the problem of global warming," a consequence of climate, "in materially 
and politically significant ways." For Demeritt, GCMs, in part, construct a representation 
of climate change that prioritizes the physical properties of greenhouse gases and reduces 
its social properties to an afterthought, the implication of which conceals and reproduces 
asymmetrical social relations. More so, Demeritt takes up concern with how social 
relations themselves affect climate models and determine which physical properties ought 
to be modeled, illustrating how the subjective side of science. Demeritt’s work reveals 
how “tacit social commitments built into the technical details of scientific knowledge and 
practice” have consequences for how we come to know climate change and climate 
change policy via scenarios that are especially porous to social relations.  
Studies of global environmental assessments (Hulme and Mahony, 2010; 
Jasanoff, 2010; Fogel, 2004), institutions (Miller, 2004; Lahsen, 2005; Hulme, 2016; 
Borie & Hulme, 2015; Waterton & Wynne, 2004), and research projects (Felt et al., 
2016; Lahsen 2009) have revealed how climate change science is intimately linked with 
politics. Such studies make apparent how some knowledge claims are legitimized over 
others (Mahony and Hulme, 2018), how some political actors exert more influence than 
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others (Lahsen, 2005; Mahony and Hulme, 2018), and how local voices and experiences 
are erased from global narratives (O’Reilly, 2015). The characterization of science as 
universal and apolitical lends itself to the assumption that climate change science cannot 
and is not exclusionary or exploitive (Schuttenberg & Guth, 2015; Ford et al., 2016). To 
be promoted as universal equates climate change science as easily accessible, neutral, and 
authoritative across all scales despite underlying power differentials. To continue 
believing that climate change science is objective and capable of painting a “true” picture 
of the environment (Jasanoff, 1987) is to continue giving power to those who benefit 
from dominant environmental narratives. However, the reach of power in climate change 
extends beyond discussions of how meaning is assigned to climate change science and 
what narratives come into being. If STS demonstrates how science and power are 
entangled, then the focus of geography is to demonstrate under what conditions.  
In tandem with STS, political geography takes up concern with how climate 
change science is produced and circulated, as well as how it gains legitimacy across time 
and space (Carey et al., 2016). Dominant climate change narratives have steered 
discussions into the area of the global where we often see discourses promoting climate 
change as a global problem that needs global solutions. However, not only does such a 
narrative plays a role in erasing local and marginalized voices, experiences, and histories 
from climate change science (O'Reilly, 2015; Fogel, 2004; Ford et al., 2016), it also hides 
geographic and economic disparities between who are the largest climate change 
contributors and who carry the burden of climate change impacts (Hovi, Skodvin, and 
Aakre, 2013). Here, it is important to note that spatial manifestations of power in climate 
change science are connected to legacies of colonialism and imperialism that have and 
 13 
continue to play a role in shaping the modern world and climate change narratives 
(Pulido, 2017; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007; Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez, 2018; Mahony & 
Hulme, 2018). Klenk and Meehan’s (2015) study is illustrative of how a drive to integrate 
across data, results, stakeholders, and projects via transdisciplinarity in climate change 
science and research projects results obscures “the friction, antagonism, and power 
inherent in knowledge co-production” through exclusionary practices that validate some 
knowledges over others. The "integration imperative" has consequences for oppositional, 
alternative, unconventional, indigenous, and other kinds of knowledge often mediated 
and silenced by Western science, a result of violent legacies. Instead, the authors offer up 
models of knowledge co-production that sits with the differences, messiness, discursive, 
but often hidden nature of climate change science that allows for engagement with 
alternative and indigenous knowledges. 
Geopolitical legacies perpetuate binaries present in representations of knowledge 
and world politics –global North versus global south, West versus rest (Agnew, 2007)– 
that reinforce notions of superiority and subordination which persist in the processes of 
producing and distributing science. The credibility and validity of climate change science 
is often determined by whom and where it was produced (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; Felt 
et al., 2016; Ford et al., 2016). For example, global North knowledge is often privileged 
as the most salient and universal, despite accounts of knowledge that reveal "universal" 
ways of knowing the world are merely projections of specific place-based historical 
experiences that become mapped onto the larger world (Agnew, 2007). Claims of 
credibility and validity also are conflated if we consider how understudied the role of 
science and its perceptions are in the global South (Lahsen, 2009). Spatial manifestations 
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of power in climate change science are commonplace in international settings and are 
played out in international conferences (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; Craggs, 2014; Craggs 
and Mahony, 2014) and in international assessments (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; Ho-Lem 
et al., 2011), where some voices and experiences attain higher rates of representation and 
participation than others despite contestations of inequality (Lahsen 2007, 2009; Fogel, 
2004; Mahony and Hulme, 2018). Contrastingly, these spaces are flaunted as producing 
equitable, neutral, and authoritative global knowledge (Jasanoff, 2010). 
Beyond an understanding of how climate change is made known via science and 
how power operates through knowledge and space, geographic research must also 
concern itself with how dominant sources of power can be transversed. Klenk and 
Meehan's (2015) models of knowledge co-production provide one example of navigating 
power in climate change science. However, more geographic research must focus on how 
to navigate or renegotiate dominant power narratives that determine how climate change 
is made known and, as a result, what is created, entangled, undone, and removed. This is 
the primary undertaking of my research. 
To achieve this goal, I attempt to bridge the knowledge gaps present in geography 
by utilizing a critical geographic approach via subaltern geopolitics (Sharp 2011, 2011, 
2013). Here, I recognize as subaltern geopolitics as a way for political geography and, by 
extension, geopolitics to engage with a number of these often-subordinated voices and 
experiences (Sharp, 2013) that may reveal novel ways of making sense of climate change 
that are obscured by traditional geopolitical discourses. This approach can provide an 
understanding of how pursuing and producing alternative geographic imaginaries 
addresses, to an extent, address matters of power and inequality present in climate change 
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science. Through a qualitative case study of the Inter-American Institute for Climate 
Change Research (IAI), I utilize a subaltern approach to demonstrate how alternative, but 
not oppositional, geopolitical narratives exist in regard to climate change science and 
how they are playing out in the Americas. I expand the scope of Sharp’s (2011, 2011, 
2013) notion of geographic imaginaries by bringing it into communication with climate 
change science discourses, and by drawing a connection to other imaginary frameworks–
specifically, Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) sociotechnical imaginary concept. In this 
research, the sociotechnical framework sheds light on how subaltern geopolitics, 
synonymous with subaltern geographic imaginaries, are pursued through science and 
technology, and ultimately how technoscientific and political orders are "co-produced" 
(Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Jasanoff, 2004). The combined analysis of the IAI's imaginary 
reveals not only how power operates through space and time via science and technology, 
but how dominant power structures can be navigated and renegotiated. This approach 
aims to develop an understanding of how power is experienced, mediated, and contested 
through scientific organizations that produce authoritative knowledge about climate 
change (e.g. the IAI); and, to explore imaginaries of climate change science that are 
located outside of dominant climate change narratives. These bodies of literature offer 
ways of understanding how geographic imaginaries are actualized via science and 
technology, and similarly, how imaginaries of science and technology have geopolitical 
implications. Ultimately, the goal of this thesis, in combining these two bodies of 
literature, is to analyze how the IAI's imaginary: (1) renegotiates sources of spatial 
power; (2) opens the domain of climate change science to excluded voices and 
experiences; (3) describes a desirable future for Latin American and Caribbean science 
 16 




 This research aims to bridge a gap in geographic research that explores how 
climate change is made known and what is created, entangled, undone, and removed it; 
and ultimately to provide an understanding of how dominant sources of power can be 
navigated and renegotiated. To accomplish these goals, I utilize two methods.  
The first method combines two conceptual frameworks: subaltern geopolitics 
(Sharp, 2011, 2011, 2013) and sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff 2015, Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2009). The former, subaltern geopolitics, has its roots in the field of political 
geography by way of critical geopolitics; the latter stems from science and technology 
studies. The aim of combining these frameworks is to reveal how power operates through 
space and time via science and technology, and how dominant sources of power can be 
transversed. Not only does this combined analysis deepen our understanding of the 
relationship between climate change and power, but it also makes theoretical 
contributions to both frameworks, and ultimately to the disciplines of geography and 
STS. By bringing subaltern geopolitics into conversation with STS via sociotechnical 
imaginaries, how geographic imaginaries can be realized via science and technology is 
illustrated. Similarly, the sociotechnical imaginary framework has much to gain from 
political geography and subaltern geopolitics. This merger identifies how the pursuit of 
desirable futures, that is, the pursuit of sociotechnical imaginaries, construct geographic 
imaginaries and are situated within traditional and subaltern geopolitics. Current 
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scholarship utilizing sociotechnical imaginaries takes into consideration the role of space 
and place, however, rarely engages with how sociotechnical imaginaries emanate from 
geopolitical relations; sociotechnical imaginaries are inherently geopolitical, as much as 
they are affected by geopolitics.  
The second method is an application of the combined analysis approach via a case 
study of the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research (IAI). While a text-
based analysis of the IAI lends itself to understanding where power is located and how it 
is navigated in climate change science, a text-based analysis alone is inadequate 
(Wiesser, 2014). Neumann (2002) notes that text-based examinations of global political 
issues often ignore how such issues are lived and experienced, and encourages a more 
situated approach; this is heightened by calls for more embedded, ethnographic 
approaches that are arising in political geography and critical geopolitics (Wiesser, 2014; 
Woon, 2013) scholarship. To understand how science, space, and power operate one must 
come into contact with the practices, opinions, and experiences of those who support, 
coordinate, and produce climate change science. In the summer of 2018, I conducted an 
institutional observation of the IAI which was guided by ethnographic approaches that 
encourage researchers to enter a social setting, become acquainted with the people in this 
setting, and systematically take note of observations (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995). 
As this fieldwork and research involved human subjects, I applied for and was granted 
Institutional Review Board approval from the University of Oregon (Protocol Number: 
12132016.020) under the umbrella of a larger research project, led by Dr. Katie Meehan, 
aimed at understanding interdisciplinary knowledge integration in the Western 
Hemisphere (Appendix B).  
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My methods of data collection included interviews, participant observation, and 
the collection of key documents. First, I conducted one-on-one semi-structured interviews 
with participants (n=13) that were completed face-to-face, except for three interviews 
which were conducted via Skype (a telecommunication application) due to differences in 
locations between myself and the participants. Participants (Table 1) represented a range 
of experiences (i.e. administrators, scientists, diplomats and country representatives, and 
former and current collaborators) with the IAI, and were demographically and 
geographically diverse. 
Table 1: Participant Demographics 
Gender No. Origin No. Profession No. 
Female  6 North America  4 Organizational  6 
Male  7 Latin America  8 Professors/Academic Researchers  4  
 Europe 1 Institutional Scientists 2  
 
 
 Country representative 1 
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in a private and closed office to ensure privacy. 
Interviews were recorded with the permission and consent of participants. Interviews 
completed via Skype were also conducted in a private office to ensure participant privacy 
and anonymity; these interviews were also recorded with the consent of participants. All 
recorded interviews (n=13) were later uploaded to a secure and password protected server 
and erased from the voice recorder. Participants were asked questions (Figure 2) related 
to their experiences with the IAI, as well as experiences doing international scientific 
work outside of the IAI.  
 
Table 2: Interview Questions 
Questions 
What is your disciplinary background and training? 
How did you become involved with the IAI?  
In your experience, what facilitates international scientific collaboration 
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Could you elaborate on some of the challenges of international scientific collaboration? 
Are any of these challenges specific to the Americas?  
IAI’s mission emphasizes capacity-building, what does this mean to you? 
How do you feel capacity building relates to addressing global/climate change issues? 
On a scale from 1-5 (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest) how important is capacity-
building to you? 
What are some challenges to capacity-building? 
What capacity building activities do you think are needed? 
Could you tell me about a project in which you were involved or oversaw that was successful, 
or close to perfect? 
Have you confronted political challenges when promoting or conducting international 
scientific collaboration? If so, could you elaborate/provide an example? 
Is scientific colonialism a concern to you? 
What research project are/were you involved with and what is/was your role? 
What’s unique about IAI? 
What do you imagine IAI looks like in the next 5 years?  
 
Interviews were later transcribed and coded using the qualitative analysis software 
ATLAS.ti. Before this analysis, I attended a workshop that provided training on the 
methodological principles and pragmatic functions of ATLAS.ti. To supplement this 
training, I also engaged with literature that provided conceptual and technical 
understandings of qualitative data analysis (Saldaña, 2011; Saldaña, 2015; Wolcott, 2008; 
Friese, 2008). The coding process involved assigning a one-word or short-phrase to 
portions of the transcribed interview; these phrases symbolize and assign an attribute to 
the selection portion of the transcribed interview. The coding process is iterative and is a 
tool utilized to identify patterns in the data via codifying and categorizing. The process of 
categorizing for this research was completed inductively and deductively, by where 
categories were created beforehand by drawing from the literature that informed this 
research and by naturally identifying categories that arose from the coding analysis. 
Ultimately, patterns and categories that result from the coding process form themes 
which inform or become theories.  
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For this research, themes that arose from the coding process included: designing 
science, types of knowledge production, scale, power, geopolitics, and institutional 
functions. The most common codes that surfaced, related to the themes mentioned above, 
were: funding, capacity-building, geopolitics, uneven development, scientific 
colonialism, temporal scale, spatial scale, ontology, multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary, 
scientific challenges, and scientific catalysts. These codes ultimately informed how I 
perceived the IAI has constructed its imaginary. Many of the participants affirmed the 
values of the IAI in their interviews, and in more implicit ways also drew meaningful 
connections between interdisciplinary science, regional knowledge, and uneven 
development –all of which are central points in my research. Through the interview and 
analysis process, I was most surprised to learn about the IAI's relationship with Cuba, 
which is discussed at length in Chapter 2. Before commencing my fieldwork, I expected 
to gain a greater understanding of how the IAI worked and how it mitigated challenges in 
the knowledge production processes. However, I did not expect the relationship between 
the United States and Cuba to surface as often as it did, nor for it to stand as an example 
of how the IAI mitigates challenges –scientific or geopolitical– in the Americas. 
I also participated in online and on-site capacity-building activities, for which I 
recorded fieldnotes. Participation in these activities was key to witnessing how the IAI 
conceptualizes and practices its role in climate change science. Through these activities, I 
met and familiarized myself with additional climate change stakeholders through 
informal conversations. Additionally, participation in these activities ensured that I came 
into contact with the practices, opinions, and experiences of those who support, 
coordinate, and produce climate change science in the region.  
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Third, I supplemented my institutional observation with a text-based analysis of 
varying (n=74) documents (i.e. founding documents, press releases, policy reports, 
project summaries, calls for proposals, memorandums of understanding, external 
institutional assessments, program evaluations) emerging from and about the Institute 
(Appendix A). These documents were also subject to the qualitative data analysis process 
described above (i.e., coding). These documents provide additional insight into the 
imaginary of climate change science that the IAI pursues, ultimately aiding my analysis 
of how the IAI enacts (i.e. lived experiences and practices) its imaginary, and represents 
(i.e. documents) it.  
However, across my methodologies, I should note that examining the relationship 
between science, space, and power over a short period does have its difficulties and 
limitations. Any understanding derived from this fieldwork is only a partial 
understanding of how the IAI understands and navigates power. Furthermore, my 
understanding is just one of many possible perspectives and is further limited by my 
"outsider" status. That is, while I am of Latin American descent, I do not work ‘inside’ 
the IAI, nor do I live in Latin America. More so, due to the temporal limits of my 
research period, I was unable to engage with the abundance of science and technology 
scholarship emanating from and written about Latin America. Additionally, focusing on 
the Institution itself, rather than member states, also limits my understanding of how 
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Introduction 
As the impacts and consequences of climate change become more apparent, 
efforts to address climate change must become more robust. Currently, response efforts at 
the international scale have geared solutions towards environmental impacts (Hulme, 
2008; Bulkeley, 2019; Demeritt, 2001) through the use of science and technology. 
However, environmental-only solutions neglect the need for systemic societal change. 
Climate changes response efforts must encompass both social and environmental causes 
and impacts. Thus, we must recognize that climate change is more than an environmental 
issue, but an issue of power and inequality (Bulkeley, 2019) as well.  
The position of geography at the nexus between the social and physical sciences 
allows us to bring forward concepts and tools from the social sciences to examine how 
power manifests in regards to the ecological and human aspects of climate change, as 
well as in regards to the natural and social sciences themselves.  Power and dominance 
have been a concern of political geography and geopolitics (Dalby, 2010; O’Tuathail, 
1999; Slater, 2008; Sharp, Routledge, Philo, and Paddison 2000) for decades. In the last 
10 years alone, much geographic scholarship has examined power and dominance in the 
context of climate change (Weisser, 2014; Craggs, 2014; Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez, 
2018; Mahony and Hulme, 2018; Miller, 2015; Carey et al, 2016; Sultana, 2014; Israel & 
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Sachs, 2013). However, only recently has political geography considered how climate 
change "comes into being, and what in turn it creates, entangles, undoes, and removes 
with it" (Bulkeley, 2019; Brace and Geoghegan, 2010).   
This research considers climate change to be an epistemological issue; as a result, 
I focus on how climate change science –the production, distribution, and use of climate 
change knowledge– plays a role in establishing and perpetuating dominant 
representations of climate change that make known a particular representation of the 
issue and support hegemonic structures of power. Understanding where power is located 
and how it works in climate change science is crucial to understanding how the issue 
comes to be represented and who is curating the narratives.  
This research brings critical geopolitics into conversation with science and 
technology studies (STS), in order to develop an understanding of how power is 
experienced, mediated, and contested through scientific organizations that produce 
authoritative knowledge about climate change; and, to explore imaginaries of climate 
change science that are located outside of dominant and oppositional climate change 
narratives. Through a synthesis and review of two theoretical frameworks, subaltern 
geopolitics (Sharp 2011, 2011, 2013) and sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim, 
2009), I respond to scholars who have called for: a re-examination of traditional 
geopolitical discourses concerning climate change (Bulkeley, 2019); a deeper 
understanding of the relationships between knowledge and power (Carey et al., 2016; 
Sultana, 2014); an inclusion of voices and experiences previously excluded from climate 
change science (Castree et al., 2014; Mahony and Hulme, 2018); and, more social science 
contributions that provide a spatial examination of knowledge (Hulme, 2008). This 
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review is supplemented by a qualitative case study of the Inter-American Institute for 
Climate change Research (hereafter referred to as the IAI or the Institute) that focuses on 
the IAI’s relationship with the United States and Cuba, as well as the IAI’s research 
agenda and programs, to illustrate how the Institute is addressing matters of power and 
inequality via its imaginary of climate change science in the Americas.  
 
Subaltern Geopolitics and Sociotechnical Imaginaries 
Traditional geopolitical scholarship has a history of relying on dominant 
narratives, derived from Western interpretation of events, and presenting research in 
terms of binaries (e.g., hegemonic versus subordinate). While such analysis is useful, it 
limits the scope of analysis for political geography and geopolitics. A reliance on 
dominant narratives and the use of binaries limits both our understanding of and 
engagement with alternative (not to be mistaken with oppositional) geographic 
imaginaries. This conclusion is drawn from the consideration that any geopolitical 
account, whether steeped in traditional discourse or otherwise, is just one account of a 
reality with a plurality of perspectives that serves a particular purpose and social order. 
Engaging with alternative representations of space and place, or representations of how 
the world is made known draws attention "to the need to negotiate across perspectives so 
that world politics in itself can be less the outcome of hegemonic impositions (and a 
dialogue of the deaf) and more the result of recognition and understanding of differences, 
both cultural and intellectual" (Agnew, 2007). As such, traditional geopolitical discourses 
must be re-examined (Bulkeley, 2019). Identifying experiences and geographies of 
knowledge that have been traditionally excluded or misrepresented as "in oppositional to" 
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or "other than" hegemonic orderings of the world provide a starting point for such re-
examination. Specifically, Joanne Sharp's (2011, 2011, 2013) framework for subaltern 
geopolitics provides the field of political geography with the tools necessary for such an 
undertaking.   
The goal of subaltern geopolitics is to reveal the many discourses, identities, 
voices, and experiences that are often silenced in traditional geopolitics (Sharp, 2013); 
the goal is to explore other present, but frequently overlooked, geopolitical narratives and 
geographic imaginations. For example, Woon (2011) illustrates how violence is 
constructed in hegemonic discourses of fear and how, via practices of nonviolence, it can 
be undone. Woon offers the lived experiences of the Reblusyonaryong Partido ng 
Manggagawa ng Mindanao, a Philippines rebel group, and their efforts to reframe their 
cause and peace talks as a way to provide an alternative narrative that exposes the 
relationship between power and knowledge in traditional geopolitical discourses on 
violence and nonviolence. In many ways, subaltern geopolitics serves to break away from 
the binaries present in traditional geopolitical discourses that “others” experiences outside 
of the dominant geopolitical narratives and renders these experiences as perpetually 
oppositional (Sharp, 2013; Sharp, 2011). For example, Sidaway's (2012) study of Libyan 
sovereignty finds that Western representations of Libyan sovereignty were deeply tied to 
Cold war and Italian-colonialist imaginaries which perceived the anti-imperial Libyan 
struggle as threatening; through dominant narratives, the Libyan revolution was not a 
claim for sovereignty, but rather an example of rogue and dangerous states.  
Subaltern geopolitics finds that various geopolitical experiences simultaneously 
exist in relation to and outside of dominant geopolitical narratives (e.g., global North 
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versus global South) and is a way for political geography and, by extension, geopolitics 
to engage with a number of these often-subordinated voices and experiences (Sharp, 
2013). A subaltern approach creates nuance not present in dominant geopolitical 
narratives. Using subaltern discourses, we can uncover the multiple ways in which the 
world is made known to us without privileging any one history or without assuming 
universality (Agnew, 2007; Sharp, 2013). Subaltern geographic imaginaries –
synonymous with subaltern geopolitics– are not a counter-narrative or alternative 
imaginary of geopolitics in the Western hemisphere. Rather, the subaltern is an additional 
conceptualization of geopolitics that is entangled and situated within more dominant 
geopolitics and holds neither to be truer than the other. In this paper, subaltern geopolitics 
is used to understand how the IAI reconfigures a geopolitical imaginary of climate 
change science in the Americas that involves producing climate change knowledge with 
actors that have been traditionally excluded or subordinated (i.e., Cuba, Latin American 
scientists and decision-makers). However, the subaltern framework has much to gain 
from science and technology studies and vice versa. Coupling the subaltern framework 
with Jasanoff and Kim's (2009) concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, we can witness to 
how science and technology aid in the production of geographic imaginaries. This merger 
identifies how the pursuit of sociotechnical imaginaries both constructs geographic 
imaginaries and are situated within discourses of dominant and subaltern geopolitics; 
sociotechnical imaginaries are inherently geopolitical, as much as they are affected by 
geopolitics.  
Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009:120) sociotechnical imaginaries “describe attainable 
futures and prescribe futures” that actors consider desirable and believe are feasibly 
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possible by way of science and technology. The concept is useful for understanding how 
the pursuit of a desirable future influences scientific research and innovation, creates 
political will or public resolve, and ultimately how technoscientific and political orders 
are “co-produced” (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Jasanoff, 2004). Sociotechnical imaginaries, 
like subaltern imaginaries, can be envisioned and pursued by a range of actors –states, 
corporations, social movements, and, as in the case of this paper, international 
organizations (Jasanoff, 2015). Drawing on Jasanoff’s (2004) work, co-production refers 
to the “proposition that the ways in which we know and represent that world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.” In regards to 
climate change science, Demeritt (2001) and Miller (2015, 2004) reveal how global 
circulation models (GCMs) construct particular understandings of our climate system. 
Furthermore, Miller’s (2015) account of global security imaginaries draws connections 
between the legitimizing power of science and the role of global institutions (i.e., UN 
agencies) in establishing particular social orders. “The idea of the Earth’s climate system 
helped give credence, meaning, and influence to the new sociotechnical imaginary of 
globalism by linking scientific visions of undesirable futures to social and political 
reconfiguration on global scales” (Miller 2015). The pursuit of a desirable future –of an 
imaginary– is an expression of power that affects the production of scientific knowledge 
and social order. Sociotechnical imaginaries are inherently an analysis of how power is 
achieved via science and technology, and subaltern geopolitics illustrates how power is 
manifested across time and space. 
Among the many ways to exercise power, power in climate change science is 
exercised by determining research priorities, funding allocations, credible actors, and 
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investments in scientific capacities and infrastructures (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). Felt et 
al., (2016) illustrates how visions of science-society interactions, informed by academic 
structures of doing science, influence how research programs value and incorporate some 
actors over others. Similarly, Meehan, Klenk, and Mendez's (2018) note how 
transdisciplinary climate knowledge and research programs, that fail to consider 
geopolitical realities, co-produce and reinforce social orders regardless of inclusive and 
apolitical language used in research objections. Particularly, the authors note how 
program funding can be reflective of power dynamics. The effects of power on science 
and technology dictate how we perceive an issue, collectively interpret our reality, how 
we validate actors and knowledge, and how we are governed in relation to a particular 
imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009).  
In this paper, both Joanne Sharp’s (2011, 2011, 2013) and Jasanoff and Kim’s 
(2009) frameworks are used to identify what kind of desirable future the IAI is pursuing; 
and how the IAI’s vision of the future influences scientific research and innovation 
constructs and represents actors (excluded and included) in regards to climate change 
science. The combined analysis of the IAI’s geographic imagination, its desired future, 
reveals not only how power operates through space and time via science and technology, 
but how dominant power structures can be navigated and renegotiated. 
 
The Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research 
To examine the role of social power in climate science, this study utilizes the 
Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research (IAI) as a template for analysis. 
Based in Montevideo, Uruguay, the IAI was established in 1992 as an intergovernmental 
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organization primarily tasked with supporting (i.e. funding, resources, infrastructure) and 
coordinating (i.e. research programs, trainings, conferences) scientific research regarding 
the extent, causes, and consequences of global change in the Americas. The IAI is 
composed of the Science Advisory Committee (SAC), the Science-Policy Advisory 
Committee (SPAC), the Executive Council (EC), the Directorate, and associates of the 
Institute (i.e., member states, affiliated institutions). Once a year, all of these divisions 
meet at the Conference of Parties (CoP).  
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of IAI. Image from the IAI. 
 
The CoP is the IAI's policy-making body. Composed of the divisions mentioned 
above of the IAI, the CoP is tasked with establishing, reviewing, and updating the IAI's 
policies (e.g., procedural, institutional, and scientific policies), scientific agenda, strategic 
plans, and financial budgets. The CoP also monitors and evaluates the work of the IAI. 
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The SAC is a 10-person committee that has been elected by the CoP, and each person 
serves a three-year term. The SAC makes recommendations to the CoP regarding the 
IAI's research programs, scientific agenda, and long-term scientific strategies and goals; 
the SAC also leads the IAI's peer review processes that evaluate the proposals and results 
from the IAI's research projects and programs. In 2013, the CoP established the SPAC as 
a body that would advise the IAI on how to apply, design, and integrate scientific 
knowledge into policy and decision-making. The Executive Council is composed of nine-
persons, each of whom serve a two-year term and are elected by the CoP. The EC is 
tasked with developing policy recommendations and sees that policies approved by the 
CoP are implemented. Lastly, the Directorate oversees the IAI’s programs and 
operations. The IAI Directorate is led by the Executive Director, who is assisted by staff 
members, a Deputy Executive Director, program managers, program officers, and interns.  
The IAI defines global change as, “the long-term chemical, biological, and 
physical processes of the Earth system” that are subject to constant alternation and “is 
both natural in origin and human-induced.”  In this paper, I render the IAI’s 
understanding of global change synonymous with broader definitions of climate change. 
The IAI’s mission is to support and use the best science available to inform decision-
makers and guide policy action on climate change. Despite its large geographic extent 
and range of member countries, the IAI is less well known than global scientific 
organizations, such as Future Earth. Member states include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. On a day-to-day basis, some of the functions of the IAI include: developing 
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research programs; developing trainings, conferences, and workshops; fundraising and 
grant writing; supporting implemented research programs; and establishing cross-
sectorial partnerships (i.e., establish relations with non-member state countries or other 
international organizations). Its broader functions include: implementing research 
programs; disseminating research findings; hosting conferences, trainings, and 




My interests in climate change science led me to Montevideo, Uruguay in 2018 
where over the course of six weeks I conducted an institutional observation of the IAI 
guided by ethnographic approaches that encourage researchers to enter a social setting, 
become acquainted with the people in this setting, and systematically take note of 
observations (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995). First, I conducted one-on-one semi-
structured interviews with participants (n=13). Second, I participated in online and on-
site capacity-building activities, including attending an international workshop in Panama 
City, Panama aimed at science diplomacy in Latin America. Third, I supplemented my 
institutional observation with a text-based analysis of varying (n=74) documents (i.e. 
founding documents, press releases, policy reports, project summaries, calls for 
proposals, memorandums of understanding, external institutional assessments, program 
evaluations) emerging from and about the Institute. Both the interviews and documents 
were subject to analysis via qualitative coding. The themes that evolved from qualitative 
analysis included: design of science, types of knowledge production, scale, power, 
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geopolitics, and institutional functions. Additionally, several codes surfaced as the most 
common during the analysis process; these codes include: funding, capacity-building, 
geopolitics, uneven development, scientific colonialism, temporal scale, spatial scale, 
ontology, multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary, scientific challenges, and scientific 
catalysts. 
 
Imaginaries in Practice at the IAI 
Over the last 25 years, climate change science supported and coordinated by the 
IAI has evolved to be needs-based, multi-scalar, and interdisciplinary –and this is 
precisely how the IAI imagines climate change science in the region ought to be.  
The IAI focuses its scientific endeavors around its science agenda. The original 
science agenda, established in 1992, had seven areas of concern for scientific research: 
tropical ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles; impacts of climate change on 
biodiversity; El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and interannual climate variability; 
ocean, atmosphere, and land interactions in the intertropical Americas; oceanic, coastal, 
and estuarine processes in temperate zones; temperate terrestrial ecosystems; and, high 
latitude processes. The science agenda was revisited in 1998, by SAC and the CoP, and 
was consolidated into four areas that focused on: understanding climate variability in the 
Americas; ecosystems, biodiversity, land use and water resources in the Americas; 
changes in the composition of the atmosphere, oceans, and fresh waters; and, integrated 
assessments, human dimensions and applications. The science agenda was once again 
revisited in 2003 by SAC, but no changes were made. The science agenda has not been 
reviewed since and these four areas continue to guide the IAI’s scientific and research 
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projects. Although the focus of this section is to understand the IAI’s desirable future 
climate change science, and set to the foundation to understand how this sociotechnical 
imaginary informs its geographic imaginary, and ultimately a subaltern geopolitics of 
climate change science in the Americas, it is worthy to note that the IAI’s science agenda 
also has implications for the IAI’s imaginary. The Institute's science agenda defines what 
areas of climate change are worth investigating, and these areas of research affect what 
kinds of projects the Institute will take on. In part, the science agenda determines the 
relevancy of a proposed project and projects that fall outside of the agenda's scope have 
little place in the IAI's imaginary. Additionally, while this paper considers climate change 
to primarily be an issue of power and inequality with environmental consequences, the 
IAI's science agenda establishes a contrasting narrative: climate change a complex 
environmental issue with socio-cultural and political consequences. In its work, the IAI 
explicitly addresses climate change as an environmental problem, but only implicitly 
addresses climate change as a matter of power and inequality. 
Over the years, the IAI has developed and executed thirteen multi-year research 
programs: Start-up Grants (SUG), Initial Science Programs (ISP) 1-3, Programs to 
Expand Scientific Capacity in the Americas (PESCA), Small Grant Programs (SGP) 1-2, 
Small Grants for Human Dimensions (SGP-HD), Small Grants for Collaborative 
Research in the Americas (SGP-CRA), Small Grants Program for Human Wellbeing 
(SGP-HW), and Collaborative Research Networks (CRN) 1-3. On occasion, the Institute 
also manages and aids the coordination and development of research and capacity 
building activities for research projects funded by external sources. For the sake of 
brevity, this paper will focus on the IAI's most notable and largest research program, the 
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Collaborative Research Network (CRN), which been deployed three times: CRN-1 in 
1999, CRN-2 in 2006, and CRN-3 in 2012. The cost and length of support per project in a 
given CRN program range depending on scope and demand, but generally each CRN has 
funded approximately 13-17 research projects for 3-5 years with funds ranging between 
USD$ 98,000-$1,000,000. The most recent program, CRN-3, was comprised of 112 
investigators across 90 institutions within 15 of the IAI’s member states and took place 
over a five-year period. As noted in Document 31 (Appendix A) the program’s first 
iteration, CRN-1, was perceived as “broad” and “self-contained” with little 
interdisciplinary opportunity; overall, CRN-1 was assessed as producing high-quality 
science but with little application and relevance. Now ending its third iteration, the 
program is considered a reflection of the IAI’s sociotechnical imaginary. As such, further 
analysis of climate change science at the IAI in this paper will strictly focus on the CRN-
3.  
Regional Imaginaries of Climate Change Science 
Previous to the CRN-3, the IAI had struggled to effectively increase the role of 
human dimensions and the social sciences in its scientific endeavors, despite these areas 
as critical to the IAI’s science agenda. Lessons learned between the CRN-2 and SGP-HD, 
leading up to the CRN-3, affected how the IAI and SAC selected proposed projects for 
funding. As Document 1 (Appendix A) illustrates, research projects selected for the 
CRN-3 were considered based on the IAI's traditional criteria: scientific excellence and 
technical soundness; relevance to the IAI's goals and objectives; multinational and 
multidisciplinary collaboration; policy relevance; stakeholder interaction and knowledge 
dissemination; contribution to capacity building, both addressing human resources and 
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institutional capacities to conduct international research and address climate change 
issues; realistic deliverables and milestones; appropriateness of the budget request. Each 
project selected was also required to work with four IAI member countries, which was 
interpreted to mean that each project must involve personnel and institutions from four 
IAI member countries. However, unlike previous CRN programs, CRN-3 added 
additional criteria: projects had to display a real commitment to interdisciplinary research 
that linked human and natural sciences (Pittman et al., 2016). "Scrutiny of the project 
proposals and work plans had to go beyond scientific peer review to ensure 
interdisciplinarity," and included scrutiny of budget percentages allocated to the social 
sciences, social science authorship and publication, and proposed details regarding social 
science fieldwork (Pittman et al., 2016). 
Having added such criteria, and after close consideration of the proposed projects' 
commitment to interdisciplinarity, the IAI ultimately rejected 93% of the CRN-3's 
proposals and approved only 10 projects. As Pittman et al. (2016) note, many of the 
CRN-3's proposed calls were found lacking and as a result "fewer proposals were funded, 
leaving funds for a second, more thematically focused call." The second call of the CRN-
3 was targeted towards the social sciences and was aimed at the interdisciplinary process 
itself with a focus on improving scientific integration in scientific research, decision-
making, and policy. Overall, the integration of the social sciences in the programs’ 
research projects increased from 33% to 87% between CRN-1 and CRN-3, with an 
increase in the use of qualitative methods also noted (Pittman et al., 2016). Particular to 
its sociotechnical imaginary, the IAI utilizes its research criteria and proposal selection 
process, as exemplified above, to materialize and pursue interdisciplinary research as a 
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preferred model for climate change science in the Americas. The IAI reinforces this 
imaginary through its language (e.g., Documents 1, 2, 32, 33, 42, 44, and 64 in Appendix 
A) and its activities (e.g., providing training on interdisciplinary methods and tools). 
Particular to the geopolitics of the Americas, pursuing an interdisciplinary future also has 
implications for who participates in climate change science. As later sections will 
explore, the IAI utilizes interdisciplinary science and technologies to pursue a geographic 
imaginary that involves cooperation between the United States and Cuba.  
Beyond interdisciplinarity, the CRN-3 was also aimed at providing needs-based 
and "policy-relevant" science, a crucial component to the Institute's values and mission. 
The extent to which the IAI produces policy-relevant science is up for debate and has 
been a point of criticism in both interviews from this project and external assessments 
(AAAS, 2007). Regardless of measurable success, the IAI reinforces its commitment to 
need-based and policy-relevant science in its work, and more specifically through the 
CRN-3 by funding projects (see Documents 25-30 and 66-73 in Appendix A) that have a 
wide variety of stakeholders (e.g. policy-makers, private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, community leaders, indigenous groups). These efforts are further 
reinforced via the Institute's additional research programs and overall capacity building 
efforts. Notably, the IAI has previously coordinated and hosted conferences and 
workshops online and onsite at the request of its member countries. For example, during 
my research period, a collection of Central American and Caribbean member countries 
had reached out to the IAI to host a workshop centered around science diplomacy and 
climate change. In October 2018, I attended a three-day workshop held in Panama City, 
Panama. As the conference agenda, Document 25 (Appendix A), shows, this included a 
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range of participants (i.e. scientists, academics, policy-makers, and diplomats) from nine 
Latin American countries, all parties to the IAI. The results of these efforts are apparent 
as Pitmann et al. (2016) note, "researchers who engaged in IAI's programs noted the 
importance of having practical outcomes," and those engaging with interdisciplinary 
research considered having tangible outcomes as a motivating factor. Similar to its 
interdisciplinary dimension, the IAI pursues needs-based, or policy-relevant, science and 
technologies by encouraging, support, and sometimes requiring place-based scientific 
knowledge. Additionally, the IAI makes itself accessible (i.e., via trainings, conferences, 
meetings, visits) to states and decision-makers when called upon by its member states. 
This too has implications for its geographic imaginary. In the case of the Panama City 
workshop, as mentioned above, I witnessed how the IAI answered the calls of its coastal 
and Central American members. The IAI hosted a science diplomacy workshop to 
support scientists and diplomats –who, as conversation with workshop participants 
revealed, felt disadvantaged by geographic location and scientific capacity– and provided 
tools for dialogue and collaboration on this specific topic. Lastly, the IAI also pursues 
and supports multi-scalar climate change science. In this regard, multi-scalar refers both 
to the geographic extent of a given project and the scale from which results are both 
derived and can be applied to. The IAI's particular imaginary of climate change science is 
driven by two additional factors. First, is the IAI's own identity as a regional 
organization. As one participant noted:  
“So the global scale informs only the negotiators of the climate change 
framework, the local scale should inform the action of county, local governments, 




The IAI's identity as a regional organization sets the scope of its work and goals. As such 
the IAI is geared towards incorporating as many countries as possible in the Western 
hemisphere, producing and disseminating knowledge in this region, and ultimately 
informing policy that would have implications for the region. Second, are expressed 
beliefs that regional knowledge is the best avenues to address climate change. Statements 
from past director (see Document 66 in Appendix A), Holm Tiessen, note “the effects of 
climate change differ greatly between ecosystems, landscapes and societies. Regional 
differentiation of knowledge and decision making is needed to address the challenges of 
global change.” 
The extent to which the IAI's imaginary is impacting the production, distribution, 
and consumption of climate change science in the Americas, and at large, is up for 
debate. Further considerations of the IAI's work also acknowledges how much of the 
IAI's imaginary for climate change science lies within dominant climate change 
narratives (e.g., global commons problem that requires international collaboration, the 
use of GCMs to construct futures, good science leads to good policy). However, the IAI's 
sociotechnical imaginary is undoubtedly reshaping how science ought to be done for its 
network of stakeholders. Just from the CRNs, program participants noted that through the 
CRN programs they were able to: learn how to do interdisciplinary research; gain 
exposure to new tools and concepts; establish and maintain interdisciplinary networks; 
rely on the mentorship and support of the IAI through all stages of the projects; and, link 
their projects to "concrete problems and connect with actors in the applied domain" 
(Pittman et al., 2016). The Institute's imaginary for climate change science is also 
creating space and opportunities for typically marginalized actors (i.e., states, scientists, 
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diplomats, government officials, universities, researchers, and graduate students from 
Latin America and the Caribbean) in the production and distribution of climate change 
science. Participation in climate change science at the Institute considers stakeholder 
occupation (e.g., scientist, diplomat), stakeholder origin and nationality, and educational 
attainment; in all of these categories, the IAI tries to open up climate change science. 
Overall, the IAI has been able to increase how many PIs native to Latin America and the 
Caribbean lead large international scientific projects (see Documents 66-73 in Appendix 
A), it has also increased South-South collaborations across the Americas (Pittman et al., 
2016; AAAS, 2007)– an effort which leads to increased scientific capacities and 
decreased dependence on resources and knowledge that are both foreign and dominant. 
Informal talks with IAI personnel also revealed recent efforts to engage with indigenous 
communities, leaders, and knowledges, as well as participatory research methods, in 
order to further broaden the scope of stakeholders in climate change science across the 
Americas. However, there was little perceivable focus on other social strata (i.e., gender, 
race, sexual orientation, and class) which play a role in silencing and marginalizing 
traditionally “othered” voices and experiences; at this juncture, the IAI has much to gain 
from intersectional discourses (Crenshaw, 1990). Overall, climate change science in the 
Americas will continue to be produced and distributed with or without the IAI, however, 
the Institute’s commitment to Latin American and Caribbean science and capacity-
building may be one of the efforts needed to transverse dominant narratives that dismiss 




The Subaltern Geopolitics of Climate Change Science in the Americas 
Producing, doing, and distributing science in the Western hemisphere is tied to 
histories of violence that have and continue to affect many aspects of producing 
knowledge in the region. Present and past accounts of scientific endeavors in the region 
are intertwined with geopolitical legacies of colonialism, exploitation, and resource 
control and development (Meehan et al., 2018; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007; Galeano, 1997; 
Hecht and Cockburn, 1989). This region, made up of the Americas (North, Central, and 
South America and the Caribbean), is itself "a constructed spatial imaginary and social 
order" that has served to sustain hegemonic and geopolitical power structures (Meehan et 
al., 2018) that remain alive and well today. As a result, climate change science in the 
Americas is witness to dominant narratives that: determine who can and cannot 
participate; legitimize particular social orders (Mahony and Hulme, 2010; Miller, 2015); 
and, give credibility and validity to a range of knowledges, environmental or otherwise, 
based on geographic origin (Felt et al., 2016; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007; Agnew, 2007). The 
consequences of these power structures produce and perpetuate binaries that posit states 
in the region as either part of the global North or outside of it, in the global South (Sharp, 
2011; Agnew, 2007). The implications of this are far-reaching, but for climate change 
science it can mean some actors are considered more credible or capable than others 
solely based on spatial arrangements. However, the subaltern geopolitics of the Americas, 
through the IAI, offers up a different vision. The subaltern geopolitical imaginary of the 
IAI is, in part, born through the Institute’s understanding and embodiment of climate 
change science, and is demonstrated below.  
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Collaborating with Cuba  
While the majority of the IAI’s membership and research is focused in Latin 
America, the majority of its funding (participants approximated somewhere between 75-
85% of the research budget) is provided by the United States. The funds provided for the 
IAI’s research budget supports small grant programs, research networks and larger 
research programs, workshops, trainings, and other short-term educational opportunities. 
This financial relationship comes with strings attached. By accepting money from the 
United States, the IAI must adhere to U.S. foreign policy when using U.S. funds. As one 
participant noted: 
"Um, in the case of the US, of course we have additional rules on spending money that 
has to be constituent with US foreign policy and in the case of Cuba, obviously there 
were considerations there for what activities we could and could not support for Cuba. 
We cautioned the IAI Directorate itself, once it had its own financial system to be up 
and running to be able to comply with those regulations." 
 
Of the numerous implications this caveat has, the most noteworthy is how this funding 
structure determines who can and cannot participate in the IAI’s research endeavors and 
by extension who can and cannot participate in climate change science within the region. 
This has specific consequences for Cuba, one of three states the United States has severed 
diplomatic relations with. Although relations with Cuba are not as restricted in 
comparison to those with Iran or North Korea (the other two states without full U.S. 
diplomatic relations), the United States continues to uphold austere restrictions regarding 
travel to and funding for Cuba or Cuban nationals. As a participant summarized:  
“One issue in terms of geopolitics in the region is the, because our funding comes 
from the US government, the issue with Cuba. Unfortunately, we haven’t been able 
to fund a lot of Cuban scientists or research projects because of the embargo and 
the current politics… Um, for the IAI, the only issue uh so far has been the 
Assistance Act issues for Cuba. Um, under the Assistance Act, we’re not allowed 
to assist, I’ll get back to that, any country with whom we do not have full diplomatic 
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relations. Now while partial diplomatic relations were achieved with Cuba, the full 
set were not, and so the Assistance Act still applies.” 
 
This relationship between the U.S. and Cuba is complex and was strained during the Cold 
War era, where a geopolitical imaginary of the world was pervasive. The history between 
these states is lengthy, complex, and has been subject to numerous analyses. Although the 
history between the United States and Cuba dates further back than the 1960s embargo, 
the starting point for this research begins with the rise of Fidel Castro.  A recap of 
modern history between the United States and Cuba dates tensions to October 1960, 
when the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba and severed diplomatic 
relations (Domínguez, 1997). The motives for such political action from the United States 
were driven by disparate political ideologies (i.e., communism versus capitalism, 
socialism versus democracy). During the Cold War, U.S. motives in the Western 
hemisphere were to contain the rise and spread of communism; a “responsibility” the 
United States took upon itself that has been linked to its historical hegemonic power in 
the region as a result of the Monroe Doctrine. However, when Fidel Castro, the 
communist revolutionary turned president turned dictator, rose to power and established 
relations with the Soviet Union, the United States proceeded to pursue a series of political 
and military strategies (i.e., economic embargo, Bay of Pigs invasion) meant to 
undermine Castro and beat the “Red Scare” (Domínguez, 1997). However, these 
strategies backfired and strengthened ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba, who 
economically and ideologically supported Cuba until its demise at the end of the Cold 
War. Yet, well after the end of the Cold War, relations with Cuba remain frozen; in some 
years they seem to thaw (i.e., Obama-era changes), but little has changed overall.  
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This funding structure is reflective of hegemonic and regional geopolitical power 
that, in part, exerts control via economic domination (Sharp, 2013). However 
complicated the relationships the IAI has with Cuba and the U.S., the IAI has long taken 
a position to include and collaborate with Cuba. For example, in 2001 (see Document 24 
in Appendix A) the IAI organized a meeting of the IAI’s executive council in La Habana, 
Cuba, requiring the IAI’s U.S. representatives and other relevant U.S. nationals to seek 
special permission to participate in the meeting. Generally, the IAI is not required to use 
U.S. funds in all of its research endeavors, and that means when utilizing non-U.S. 
monies, the IAI is not required (some exceptions apply) to uphold U.S. foreign policy. 
The IAI uses this loophole to advance its relationship with Cuba, as well as Cuba’s 
relationship with other Latin American states. On numerous occasions, past and present, 
the IAI has leveraged its diplomatic relations with its other member parties to support 
Cuba, most of whom have no historical animosity for the state. As one participant says: 
“One issue in terms of geopolitics in the region is the, because our funding comes 
from the US government, the issue with Cuba… We’ve been trying to overcome 
that barrier, you know, looking for resources somewhere else.” 
 
 
The IAI works with its member parties to find in-kind and external funds to support 
Cuban attendance and participation in all of its research endeavors. For example, during 
the science diplomacy workshop in Panama, Cuban representatives and scientists were 
able to attend and participate due to support from Guatemala and Panama. Similarly, the 
IAI works to ensure Cuban stakeholders can participate in its research programs, attend 
the annual CoP, and participate in other activities such as trainings and workshops. In this 
manner, the IAI constantly challenges the power relations derived from such an 
imaginary that seeks to "reproduce subordinate modes of representation" (Sharp, 2013; 
 44 
Sharp, Routledge, Philo, & Paddison, 2000; Slater, 2008). The IAI's rejection and 
navigation of regional hegemonic power is a reworking of dominant geopolitics (Sharp 
2011; Sharp 2013). While the U.S. and Western representations of Cuba position it as 
outside of or resistant to U.S. geopolitical imaginaries, the IAI repositions Cuba within 
different geopolitics –subaltern geopolitics. The IAI pulls Cuba out of the margins of 
geopolitical discourses via a reimagination of what geopolitics in the region ought to be 
like that is actualized through the IAI's vision of climate change science and 
technologies. The IAI, and by extension, Cuba, are Sharp's (2013) "people" who "have 
been differently entangled with networks of domination and resistance, who can neither 
be seen as below or outside, but nor could they be seen as powerful, central, or 
dominant." 
Colonialism and Exclusivity in Climate Change Science 
The power structures and dominant narratives established from centuries of 
violent geopolitical legacies in the Western hemisphere affect more than just political 
relations, as demonstrated above. These legacies have established and reinforced 
dominant narratives of knowledge validity and credibility based on geographic origin. In 
this section, I focus on how the IAI has pursued a subaltern geopolitics of knowledge 
production, working to increase perspectives in climate change science that “do not either 
privilege a singular history of knowledge […] or presume conceptions of knowledge that 
implicitly or explicitly assume their own self-evident universality” (Agnew, 2007). 
Considering geopolitical narratives affect “knowledge relations” (Felt et al., 2016) 
in the Americas, then the relationship between actors can be defined through the 
exchange of knowledge. Here, the term “knowledge relations” refers to how place is 
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related to knowledge; specifically, “relationships between actors are defined through the 
exchange of knowledge” as well as to the positioning of different types of knowledge to 
one another (Felt et al., 2016). Thus, based on a history of the region, the relationship 
between the categorical global North and global South in the Western hemisphere can be 
defined as exploitive. A history of Latin America reveals practices of “scientific 
colonialism” (Lahsen & Nobre, 2007) –“the use of less developed countries’ human and 
material resources in ways that minimally benefit the poorer host countries in terms of 
intellectual, human, and material gains”– that are as problematic today. For centuries, the 
global North has dug up, carved, and destroyed many ecosystems, among other resources, 
in the name of science, with little regard for environmental, social, economic, or political 
consequences. These effects of colonialism linger today; violent practices and legacies 
have entrenched particular social orders within the region, the result of which are a 
reinforcement of uneven power structures, and systems of oppression and inequality often 
perpetuated by previous colonial subjects.  
In Latin America, we don’t have to look much farther than Amazonia for an 
example. As Hecht (2013) notes, “The Scramble for the Amazon has received little 
attention… yet the final outcome is reflected in every modern map of South America.” 
Today, in the context of producing, distributing, and using climate change science, these 
practices look different. During the interview process participants identified what some 
exploitive practices look like today: an international research project with an American 
primary investigator (PI), mostly American research assistants, and underpaid local 
translators; or multi-national projects with non-Americans serving in marginal roles as a 
check for funding requirements; or conflicts over authorship and research publication; or 
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research projects that extract knowledge but do not benefit the local community or host 
country; the list could go on. As a participant recalls: 
“I felt sort of sad for Latin America. It was clear what was happening was that you 
would get a team from US and maybe a team from Canada who were the ones who 
really knew what they wanted to do what kind of research and then because it was 
a prerequisite to involve more than I think 2 or 3 countries, this was like you know 
like European culture, they would invite people from I don’t know Bolivia or 
Nicaragua so it was like a check. I involved people from Bolivia, check. I involved 
people from Nicaragua, check. It was a very uneven situation, you had very strong 
research teams and often students from Canada, U.S. and then weak teams from 
other countries. It was like a joke, it was like a game.” 
 
These practices are conflated by other factors favoring sustained hegemonic power, such 
as the acceptance of English as the de facto language of science, or deep asymmetries in 
the scientific infrastructure and capacities between states.  
The IAI has certainly been working to redefine knowledge relations in Latin 
America in two key ways. Primarily, the IAI has sought to improve scientific capacities 
in Latin American and the Caribbean via its scientific research and capacity building 
efforts, the latter of which is "particularly important in less developed countries, as they 
have fewer financial resources and are most vulnerable to the multiple stresses that arise 
from rapid, simultaneous changes in social and environmental systems" (Lahsen & 
Nobre, 2007; Kates et al., 2001). A 2007 (AAAS) external evaluation of the IAI, 
conducted by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) notes 
that "Over the past 13 years, the IAI has witnessed a steady increase in the number of 
member countries with sufficient capacity to lead large CRN projects […] the Institute's 
greatest regional contribution has been in successfully building scientific capacity 
throughout the Americas." The IAI has achieved success in its capacity-building efforts 
through several practices that include: providing consistent mentorship across time and 
space, encouraging scientific innovation, funding and coordinating networking and 
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network-building, keeping stakeholders up to date with concepts and methodologies, and 
providing feedback through all stages (calls for proposals, proposal selection, and 
implementation) of a program (Pittman et al., 2016). Additionally, the IAI has also 
worked to challenge who can and cannot participate in climate change science at the level 
of the body. The AAAS's (2007) external evaluation of the IAI reveals that since 1996 
the number of Latin American and Caribbean PIs has steadily increased. Currently, Latin 
American and Caribbean PIs exceed U.S. or Canadian PIs by more than 65%. 
Additionally, the IAI has significantly promoted research collaborations between Latin 
American and Caribbean states, an attempt to increase "South-South collaborations" and 
minimize dependency on global North institutions and resources. Between the two most 
recent iterations of its largest research program, Collaborative Research Networks 
(CRN), CRN-2 and CRN-3, the number of South-South collaborations increased from 
52% to 67% respectively (Pittman et al., 2016). 
Over time, the IAI has steadily increased the number of Latin American and 
Caribbean stakeholders involved in climate change science. The interdisciplinary 
approach pursued by the IAI, discussed in previous sections, has increased participation 
from the non-science community. In its work, the Institute pursues and requires work 
from the private sector, non-governmental organizations, community leaders, and 
decision-makers. This is evidenced, in part, by: its partnership with the funding platform 
Belmont Forum (see Document 65 in Appendix A); other partnerships with organizations 
such as the AAAS, or Organization for American States (see Documents 36-40 in 
Appendix A); participants from its previous seminars, conferences, and workshops (see 
Documents 25-30 in Appendix A); and, its research projects and calls for proposals (see 
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Documents 1-3 and 66-73 in Appendix A). The IAI's efforts to increase and improve 
scientific capacity works in tandem with the representation efforts detailed above to 
address issues of exclusion, representation, and knowledge validity, to an extent, in 
climate change science. Some of the IAI's most recent endeavors have also sought to 
broaden the inclusion of participatory research, and local and indigenous knowledges. 
However, the IAI's work does meet a limitation here; the IAI has pursued a model of 
inclusivity that does not consider all social strata; as earlier sections commented, the IAI 
could benefit from intersectional discourses (Crenshaw, 1990). 
 
Discussion 
The dual imaginary approach utilized in this paper focuses on the spaces that 
traditional geopolitics ignores to reveal new pathways of engaging with and representing 
climate change science. More broadly, the significance of the IAI’s imaginary through a 
synthesis of subaltern geopolitics and sociotechnical imaginaries reveals new ways of 
engaging with geopolitical discourses. For example, breaking away from traditional 
geopolitical discourses reveals not only how we can include previously excluded or 
exploited voices, by way of documenting their lived experience (i.e., the experience of 
the IAI), but also how its already being done. Engaging with geopolitical discourses 
outside of the dominant literature allows us to deepen our understanding between science, 
space, and power so that we may ask new questions moving forward. More importantly, 
this engagement allows us to address matters of power in climate change science, and 
follow in the footsteps of those already working towards fair and equitable 
representations of climate change. 
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The subaltern and sociotechnical frameworks utilized in this paper reveal how the 
IAI’s imaginary is both subjected to and a mediator of power in climate change science. 
For the IAI, power is mainly experienced by way of funding and support structures, 
geopolitical legacies and relations, and exclusivity in knowledge production. The 
combined consequences of dominant geopolitical narratives, exploitive practices, and 
additional factors revealed two problems. First, environmental knowledge production has 
a representation problem. Second, environmental knowledge produced in the global 
South is perceived as less credible or less valid. However, the IAI navigates these 
obstacles by pursuing their own particular vision of how climate change science ought to 
be. The IAI accomplishes this vision through practices and activities (i.e., capacity-
building, workshops, seminars, research projects) that codify climate change science in 
the region as multi-scalar, needs-based, interdisciplinary, and inclusive. Across the 
Americas, the IAI has been instrumental in developing South-South relations and 
scientific capacities, which not only minimizes dependence on global North resources 
and institutions, but lends itself to challenging misconceptions about knowledge validity 
produced outside of the global North imaginary. This is supplemented by the Institute's 
efforts to increase participation in climate changes science by opening up science-making 
to previously excluded states and individuals. In broader terms, the dual imaginary 
approach may prove beneficial to identifying experiences, like the IAI’s, that are 
rendered as outliers in the climate change science community. The IAI’s small presence 
in this community, compared to the IPCC or other organizations such as Future Earth, 
often renders its efforts invisible. To date, only a handful of studies take up discussion 
with the social processes involved with producing climate change science at the IAI, and 
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across the Americas more broadly. Yet further analysis of the climate change science in 
the region and at the Institute could be revealing of both additional tensions and 
challenges, as well as novel practices for navigating power in a crowded international 
system.  
As this paper shows, the IAI's imaginary for climate change science relies on a 
reconfiguration of geopolitics in the Americas, as well as on particular science and 
technologies. However, the IAI's imaginary does have its limits, as it always will. In 
terms of dominant geopolitical narratives, any reconfiguration of geopolitical relations is 
not completely outside of hegemonic special and social orderings. Much of the work the 
IAI does may address some of these sources of power, but ultimately, hegemonic 
orderings of the world will continue to affect how we produce climate change science and 
how we come to know it. For example, while the IAI can find ways of circumventing 
U.S. influence in terms of supporting Cuba, these geopolitical relations remain a 
hindrance to science in the region at large. More broadly the IAI must still navigate 
systems of oppression and inequality that its member states are simultaneously subject 
and complicit to. The ability for the IAI to address every challenge is impossible, and 
rather a total reconfiguration of society, and how we produce knowledge, would be 
required. Additionally, the IAI itself is complicit to excluding and silencing voices and 
experiences. Although much of the IAI's work places emphasis on uplifting voices from 
the Americas, its lack of intersectional awareness perpetuates systems of exclusion 
especially along lines of race and gender. Further analysis of the Institute could reveal 
additional tensions among its stakeholders, especially if we ask questions regarding the 
values of some actors in comparison to others. My experiences at the IAI have, 
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superficially, led me to conclude that, for the IAI, scientists and high-level decision-
makers are valued more than extra-scientific actors, such as the public. I should note that 
this is also a result of the IAI's mission and mandate; it was designed specifically to 
engage with these two actors. Additionally, regarding dominant climate science 
representations, the IAI engages with many discourses that accept the global commons 
problem as true, and GCMs as authoritative renderings of the Earth system's future. 
Similar to the work of Van der Hel (2015), the IAI operates "on a precarious balance 
between doing more of the same under a different name, and supporting and steering 
research communities towards new modes of knowledge production." 
More broadly, the synthesis of subaltern geopolitics and sociotechnical imaginary 
frameworks can inform our understanding of similar organizations. Applying this dual 
analysis approach to other organizations, be it Future Earth, the IPCC, or beyond, we can 
identify how particular imaginaries are pursued across time and space via science and 
technology. Yet, because these frameworks are also inherently about discussing power 
and where it's held, utilizing subaltern geopolitics and sociotechnical imaginaries together 
can be revealing of how similar organizations exercise of navigate power in regards to 
climate change. More so, the application of subaltern geopolitics to climate change helps 
us draw out the multitude of places and experiences that are silenced in more traditional 
discourses which can provide a more meaningful understanding of how power operates 






Climate change is not just an environmental problem. Climate change is a matter 
of power and inequality with environmental consequences. However, we come to 
understand climate change as an environmental problem through dominant 
representations and narratives of the environment that obscure underlying sources of 
power and inequality. More so, dominant environmental narratives work to obscure the 
relationship between science, space, and power; a synthesis of STS and political 
geography literature draws attention to such a relationship. In the context of climate 
change science, STS reveals how the objective designation given to science reinforces 
dominant narratives, projects place-based knowledge as universal and authoritative, 
removes subjectivity and meaning from science, and serves to perpetuate modes of 
subordination via exclusion. Geographic literature in this regard, supplements findings 
from STS scholarship by contextualizing how the relationship between climate change 
science and power has a spatial component that regulates knowledge production and 
distribution, and participation and representation. The combination of these disciplines 
broadens our understanding of how power utilizes science and space as a vehicle. 
However, little scholarship has looked at sites that seek to renegotiate power structures 
and differentials. By combining a geopolitical and STS framework, this research 
illustrates the additional, alternative imaginaries of climate change science that are 
playing out in the Americas. These imaginaries, both subaltern and sociotechnical, work 
to uncover how narratives regarding climate change science exist both within and outside 
of dominant environmental narratives. Ultimately, such an analysis illustrates how power 
is being navigated and renegotiated across science and space. Additionally, this research 
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serves to, an extent, answer scholars calling for the re-examination of traditional 
geopolitical discourses concerning climate change (Bulkeley, 2019); a deeper 
understanding of the relationships between knowledge and power (Carey et al., 2016; 
Sultana, 2014); an inclusion of voices and experiences previously excluded from climate 
change science (Castree et al., 2014; Mahony and Hulme, 2018); and, more social science 





















APPENDIX A: LIST OF DOCUMENTS FOR TEXT-BASED ANALYSIS 
No. Document Name Document Type 
1 Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research Call 
for Proposals, Collaborative Research Network 3 
Call for Proposal 
2 Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research 
Small Grants Program for Human Wellbeing Call for 
Proposals 
Call for Proposal 
3 Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research 
Small Grants Program for Human Wellbeing Call for 
Proposals, Full Proposal Guidelines 
Call for Proposal 
4 Conference of Parties 2015 Report of 40th meeting of 
the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
5 Conference of Parties 2015 Report of the 39th Meeting 
of the Inter-American Institute for Global Change 
Research Executive Council (EC) 
Conference of Parties Report 
6 Conference of Parties 2015 Report of the 23rd Inter-
American Institute for Global Change Research 
Conference of the Parties (Conference of Parties) 
Conference of Parties Report 
7 Conference of Parties 2016 Report of the 24th meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties 
Conference of Parties Report 
8 Conference of Parties 2016 Report of the 41th meeting 
of the Executive Council  
Conference of Parties Report 
9 Conference of Parties 2016 Report of the 42th meeting 
of the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
10 Conference of Parties 2017 Report of the 25th meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties 
Conference of Parties Report 
11 Conference of Parties 2017 Report of the 43th meeting 
of the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
12 Conference of Parties 2017 Report of the 44th meeting 
of the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
13 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 25th meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties 
Conference of Parties Report 
14 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 2nd Science-
Policy Workshops of the Inter-American Institute for 
Global Change Research 
Conference of Parties Report 
15 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 43th meeting 
of the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
16 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 44th meeting 
of the Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
17 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the Directorate on 
Capacity Building 
Conference of Parties Report 
18 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the Inter-American 
Institute for Global Change Research Directorate on 
Science-Policy 
Conference of Parties Report 
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19 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the Inter-American 
Institute for Global Change Research Directorate on 
Science 
Conference of Parties Report 
20 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 26th meeting 
of the Conference of Parties to the Inter-American 
Institute for Global Change Research 
Conference of Parties Report 
21 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 45th meeting 
of the Inter-American Institute for Global Change 
Research Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
22 Conference of Parties 2018 Report of the 46th meeting 
of the Inter-American Institute for Global Change 
Research executive council 
Conference of Parties Report 
23 Conference of Parties 2018 2nd joint meeting of the 
Scientific Advisory Committee and Science Policy 
Advisory Committee 
Conference of Parties Report 
24 Conference of Parties Report of the 14th Meeting of the 
Executive Council 
Conference of Parties Report 
25 Objectives of the Science Diplomacy Workshop Event Program 
26 Professional Development Seminar: Transdisciplinary 
Approaches to Integrating Policy and Science for 
Sustainability 
Event Program 
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